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NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
     In this diversity action alleging legal malpractice, the 
Populist Party, its Executive Director and National Chairman, 
Donald P. Wassall, various other Executive Committee Members, and 
the Populist Observer ("plaintiffs") sue their former attorney, 
Jeffrey R. DeCaro, and the two law firms at which DeCaro 
practiced law while representing plaintiffs ("malpractice 
defendants").  The district court granted summary judgment for 
malpractice defendants, interpreting the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court case Muhammad v. Strassburger, McKenna, Messer, Shilobod & 
Gutnick, 587 A.2d 1346 (Pa.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 867 (1991), 
to bar plaintiffs' claims because plaintiffs had agreed to a 
dismissal of their defamation action for failure to prosecute.  
We will reverse. 
                                I. 
     In July 1991, while DeCaro was a partner at O'Malley and 
Miles, Wassall and the Populist Party engaged DeCaro's services 
to sue The Spotlight, a political newspaper, and several other 
defendants ("defamation defendants"), for printing negative 
stories about Wassall and the Populist Party.  After the 
defamation suit was removed to federal court by the defamation 
defendants in October 1991, DeCaro failed to serve three 
defamation defendants, Mr. Piper, Mr. Tiffany, and Mr. Ryan, 
within the allotted 120 days.  Although the court extended the 
time for service, DeCaro again failed to serve them.   
     In December 1992, DeCaro left O'Malley and formed the new 
firm of DeCaro, Doran, Siciliano, Gallagher, Sonntag & DeBlasis, 
where he continued to represent plaintiffs in the defamation 
action.  Over eighteen months after he filed the complaint, 
DeCaro still had not served the three defendants.  Consequently, 
in July 1993, the court dismissed the claims as to these three 
defendants for lack of service.  
     In litigating the underlying defamation case, DeCaro's 
stewardship was shoddy at best.  The record indicates that he 
missed several deadlines, misfiled pleadings, and finally, failed 
to file a pretrial statement required by the magistrate judge.  
After DeCaro failed to file the pretrial statement, the 
magistrate judge held a hearing to determine if plaintiffs' 
defamation suit should be dismissed for failure to prosecute.  At 
argument, the magistrate judge agreed to give DeCaro two more 
weeks to work toward settlement and to file the pretrial 
statement, but Wassall suggested that the plaintiffs' defamation 
claims and the defamation defendants' counterclaims be dismissed 
for failure to prosecute.  Plaintiffs assert that they agreed to 
the dismissal because they "did not wish to suffer with 
defendants any longer and [wanted] to put a merciful end to two 
and a half years of malpractice. . . ."  Defamation defendants 
agreed to the mutual dismissals, and the magistrate judge 
recommended that the district court dismiss the claims and 
counterclaims for failure to prosecute.  The district court 
adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and dismissed both 
actions, thus ending the defamation action. 
     Plaintiffs then filed this legal malpractice action against 
DeCaro, the DeCaro firm and the O'Malley firm.  Plaintiffs allege 
numerous acts of malpractice by DeCaro, inter alia:  failing to 
work diligently to settle the case, which resulted in an 
unfavorable settlement; failing to move the case toward trial; 
failing to serve three of the defendants in the defamation 
action; failing to object to the magistrate judge's 
recommendations timely; failing to meet almost every deadline; 
failing to answer the counterclaim timely; failing to request 
that the court set aside default judgments; filing a motion to 
dismiss the counterclaim on behalf of counterclaim-defendants who 
had not been served, but not on behalf of those who had; failing 
to amend the complaint to incorporate many alleged ongoing 
libels; misrepresenting, repeatedly, what services he would 
perform for plaintiffs; failing to file a motion to dismiss the 
counterclaims in the case filed by defendants/counterclaim- 
plaintiffs and instead filing it in plaintiffs' case; 
misrepresenting himself as an expert in defamation litigation; 
failing to proceed with discovery; failing to request extension 
of discovery deadlines and misrepresenting to plaintiffs that he 
had; and failing to provide plaintiffs with filed documents.  
Plaintiffs were unsatisfied with DeCaro's stewardship in every 
aspect. 
     The malpractice defendants filed a motion to dismiss, which 
the district court denied.  The court granted malpractice 
defendants' motion to bifurcate discovery and limit discovery to 
whether Muhammad barred the malpractice suit.  After limited 
discovery, malpractice defendants filed a motion for summary 
judgment, which the district court granted.  The district court 
believed that, because plaintiffs agreed in the underlying action 
to permit the court to dismiss for DeCaro's failure to prosecute, 
the dismissal constituted a settlement, and that, under Muhammad, 
the settlement barred the malpractice action. 
                               II. 
     Plaintiffs appeal, arguing that agreeing to dismissal of the 
underlying defamation suit for failure to prosecute was not a 
"settlement," and that even if it were a settlement, this would 
not bar their suit.  We need not resolve whether this constitutes 
a settlement. 
     As a federal court sitting in diversity, we must do what we 
predict the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would do. See, e.g., Erie 
Castings Co. v. Grinding Supply, Inc., 736 F.2d 99, 100 (3d Cir. 
1984).  In making this determination, we give proper regard to 
the opinions of Pennsylvania's intermediate courts.  See id. at 
100.  The policies underlying applicable legal doctrine, current 
trends in the law and decisions of other courts also inform our 
decision. See id. 
     Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, 
as we must when reviewing a grant of summary judgment, it appears 
that DeCaro did not negotiate and complete a settlement, 
frustrated efforts to have the case amicably resolved, wasted the 
resources of the courts by his "footdragging," and seriously 
impaired plaintiffs case, necessitating the agreement to have the 
case dismissed.  We predict that given these allegations and this 
record the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not extend its 
holding in Muhammad to bar this action. 
                                A. 
     Applying Muhammad, the district court held that  
     [u]nder Pennsylvania law, a dissatisfied plaintiff may 
     not maintain a suit for legal malpractice against his 
     attorney following a settlement to which the plaintiff 
     agreed. 
The court erred, however, by not heeding the policy concerns 
expressed in Muhammad. 
     Indeed, we believe the district court interpreted Muhammadtoo 
broadly, ignoring subsequent opinions by the Pennsylvania 
Superior Court which are well-reasoned and interpret Muhammadnarrowly.  We 
are convinced that the case was meant to bar an 
action against an attorney who negotiates and consummates a 
settlement or similar agreement.  We predict that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would consider the policies enunciated 
in Muhammad and find that they favor allowing the plaintiffs' 
present action for malpractice.  
                                B. 
     The Pennsylvania Supreme Court announced in Muhammad that a 
client who becomes dissatisfied with an attorney's settlement of 
an action, which the client had accepted, cannot then sue the 
attorney for malpractice.  In Muhammad, the plaintiffs originally 
sued a hospital and others for medical malpractice.  During 
settlement negotiations, the hospital offered $23,000.00 to 
settle the case and plaintiffs communicated their acceptance to 
their attorney.  The court suggested that the hospital increase 
its offer to $26,500.00, which it did.  Again, plaintiffs 
accepted the settlement.  Later, plaintiffs informed their 
attorney that they were no longer satisfied with the amount of 
the settlement.  Notwithstanding the plaintiffs' protest, the 
court enforced the agreement.  Plaintiffs then hired new counsel 
and appealed, but the enforcement was affirmed on appeal.  
Undeterred, plaintiffs filed a malpractice suit against their 
trial attorney.  On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
adopted a rule that important policy considerations supporting 
settlements barred the subsequent legal malpractice action. 
     Although motivated by several considerations, the 
encouragement of settlement was the most important motivating 
factor for the court's decision.  It opined: 
     The primary reason we decide today to disallow 
     negligence or breach of contract suits against lawyers 
     after a settlement has been negotiated by the attorneys 
     and accepted by the clients is that to allow them will 
     create chaos in our civil litigation system.  Lawyers 
     would be reluctant to settle a case for fear some 
     enterprising attorney representing a disgruntled client 
     will find a way to sue them for something that "could 
     have been done, but was not."  We refuse to endorse a 
     rule that will discourage settlements and increase 
     substantially the number of legal malpractice cases.  A 
     long-standing principle of our courts has been to 
     encourage settlements; we will not now act so as to 
     discourage them. 
587 A.2d at 1349 (emphasis added). 
     The court also expressed its disfavor of "litigation 
concerning litigation:" 
     Particularly troublesome to the efficacy of the courts 
     are these "second bite" cases; they require twice the 
     resources as a single case, yet resolve only a single 
     litigant's claims--thus denying access to the courts to 
     litigants who have never had a single resolution of 
     their dispute.  For that reason, henceforth we should 
     view "litigation concerning litigation" cases with a 
     jaundiced eye. 
Id. at 1350.  As noted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the 
policy of avoiding "litigation concerning litigation" is aimed at 
preserving resources and allowing access to the courts by other 
litigants.  The court, however, did not justify the decision to 
bar the malpractice action primarily based on this concern, but 
on the goal of encouraging settlements. 
     The Pennsylvania Superior Court originally read Muhammadbroadly, see 
Miller v. Berschler, 621 A.2d 595, 598 (Pa. Super. 
1993) (Wieand, J., dissenting).  The en banc court, however, in 
McMahon v. Shea, 657 A.2d 938 (Pa. Super. 1995) (en banc) (five 
judge majority, four in dissent, with one concurring statement), 
alloc. granted, 674 A.2d 1074 (Pa. 1996), overturned the panel's 
decision in Miller.  In several cases, the Superior Court has 
held that legal malpractice actions are not barred:  1) if the 
attorney sued did not settle the case; (2) if the malpractice 
plaintiff was forced to settle because of the attorney's 
negligence; or (3) if the malpractice plaintiff does not try to 
question, retrospectively, the amount of the settlement the 
attorney negotiated.  See, e.g., White v. Kreithen, 644 A.2d 1262 
(Pa. Super.), alloc. denied, 652 A.2d 1324 (Pa. 1994); McMahon.  
All three of these situations operate in this case.  Even 
assuming that plaintiffs' agreement to the dismissal for failure 
to prosecute constituted a settlement of the underlying action, 
under the superior court authority, the plaintiffs would be 
allowed to prosecute this malpractice case. 
     At one point in Muhammad, discussing the fraud exception, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court states: 
     It is not enough that the lawyer who negotiated the 
     original settlement may have been negligent; rather, 
     the party seeking to pursue a case against a lawyer 
     after settlement must plead, with specificity, fraud in 
     the inducement. 
587 A.2d at 1351 (emphasis added).  Superior court cases have 
interpreted the language in Muhammad referring to the attorney 
having negotiated the settlement, 657 A.2d at 1349, 1351, to mean 
that Muhammad applies only to malpractice actions in which the 
client sues the attorney who negotiated and completed the 
settlement.  See, e.g., White; see also Goodman v. Kotzen, 647 
A.2d 247 (Pa. Super. 1994) (malpractice action allowed against 
attorney who did not consummate settlement, but not allowed as to 
attorneys who did), alloc. denied, 655 A.2d 989 (Pa. 1995).  This 
narrow reading of Muhammad comports with the express policy 
concerns prompting the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision. 
     In White, a case more analogous to the situation here, the 
superior court concluded that when a client is forced to settle a 
case because of the attorney's negligence, the attorney may not 
invoke Muhammad to preclude the malpractice claim, stating: 
     [A]fter appellant discharged appellees, allegedly for 
     failure to properly investigate and prepare her case 
     for trial, appellant was forced, due to her inability 
     to retain counsel, to accept the settlement figure 
     proposed by the judge.  Moreover and quite importantly, 
     none of the motivating reasons for the Supreme Court 
     decision in Muhammad would be achieved by finding the 
     instant malpractice action barred. . . . 
644 A.2d at 1265; accord Lowman v. Karp, 476 N.W.2d 428 (Mich. 
Ct. App. 1991) (plaintiff put in position where settlement was 
only choice may sue for malpractice); Edmondson v. Dressman, 469 
So.2d 571 (Ala. 1985) (same); Prande v. Bell, 660 A.2d 1055 (Md. 
Ct. Spec. App. 1995) (client told she had no choice but to settle 
may sue attorney for malpractice). 
     Malpractice defendants argue that plaintiffs were not 
"forced" to settle.  This misses the point.  Plaintiff "wanted 
out" of the case, not for what they were getting in a settlement, 
but because DeCaro had so shabbily represented them that they 
merely wanted an end to the legal travail DeCaro had inflicted 
upon them.  The allegations and matters of record, taken in the 
light most favorable to plaintiffs, suggest that, like the 
plaintiff in White, plaintiffs here had little other choice. 
     Malpractice defendants' reliance on Martos v. Concilio, 629 
A.2d 1037 (Pa. Super. 1993) and Spirer v. Freeland Kronz, 643 
A.2d 673 (Pa. Super. 1994), alloc. denied, 673 A.2d 336 (Pa. 
1996), is misplaced.  In both Martos and Spirer the attorney sued 
for malpractice had done what he was hired to do:  the attorney 
had negotiated and completed the settlement agreement.  Moreover, 
both cases were decided before the superior court decision in 
McMahon which announced that Muhammad was to be construed more 
narrowly. 
         Malpractice defendants assert that  
         [a]ny settlement negotiations of Mr. DeCaro were 
         precluded by the appellants' actions in requesting that 
         the underlying actions be dismissed.  Thus, appellants 
         cannot now be heard to complain that Mr. DeCaro failed 
         to negotiate the settlement to which Mr. Wassall 
         agreed. 
This argument might be persuasive had DeCaro exerted a modicum of 
effort towards settlement.  The record reveals that at every turn 
DeCaro missed yet another deadline.  Of equal significance, the 
record also suggests that he further jeopardized the plaintiffs' 
defense to the counter-claim filed against them.  With every 
minute the case continued with DeCaro, plaintiffs' negotiation 
position arguably waned and it became less likely that the 
defamation defendants would be willing to settle the claims and 
counter-claims on favorable terms, if at all.  DeCaro cannot 
seriously argue that, because plaintiffs wanted him out of the 
case so bad that they were willing to accept a dismissal of their 
own case, he is entitled to walk away from his acts and 
omissions.  Accepting this argument, surely, far from encouraging 
settlements, would reward indolence and incompetence. 
         Although the Pennsylvania Superior Court has viewed 
Muhammadnarrowly, it has done so not by creating artificial distinctions, 
but by paying heed to the policy concerns underlying the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding in Muhammad.  A federal 
district court in this circuit also has adopted the Superior 
Court's position that Muhammad does not announce a broad rule.  
In Builders Square, Inc. v. Saraco, 868 F. Supp. 748 (E.D. Pa. 
1994), the client sued its attorney for malpractice.  The 
district court distinguished Muhammad, stating: 
         This is not an action by a client who later became 
         dissatisfied with a settlement agreement consummated by 
         his attorney with the client's assent.  It is an action 
         by a client dissatisfied with his attorney for 
         allegedly failing to communicate settlement offers and 
         depriving his client of an opportunity to settle a case 
         on terms far more favorable than those later available 
         in the circumstances in which the client was placed by 
         the attorney's conduct. 
Id. at 750. 
         The district court in Builder's Square emphasized that its 
ruling did not frustrate Pennsylvania's policy of encouraging 
settlement because the attorney's negligence involved his failure 
to communicate an earlier, more favorable, settlement offer.  It 
also distinguished Martos and Spirer by stating that those cases 
involved clients who had become dissatisfied with the 
consequences of their own decision to settle and were merely 
expressing "retrospective unhappiness" with the settlement 
agreement.  The client in Builder's Square was dissatisfied at 
the time of settlement, but was trying to mitigate the effects of 
the attorney's negligence. 
                                C. 
         The policies expressed in Muhammad, to preserve resources 
and allow access to the courts by other litigants, are served by 
allowing the present action for malpractice.  Plaintiffs' 
allegations, if proven, show an enormous waste of the court's 
time by an unprepared attorney.  Where the attorney's conduct in 
this regard "forces" a client to acept a dismissal of the case, 
allowing a subsequent malpractice action serves as a systemic 
deterrent for this behavior and thus promotes the policies 
articulated in Muhammad.  An attorney who has neglected his role 
as steward, hopelessly delaying, and perhaps prohibiting, the 
system from properly resolving his client's case, should not be 
able to seek safe haven in a dismissal that resulted because the 
client could not risk allowing the attorney further to neglect 
his role.  Under these conditions, we are convinced that the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not shield DeCaro from liability 
under the guise of encouraging settlements in general.   
         Moreover, DeCaro's alleged conduct runs counter to the 
policy of encouraging settlements.  It would be perverse, indeed, 
if under Muhammad, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not allow 
this case to go forward.  One of plaintiffs' major complaints is 
DeCaro's footdragging in settlement negotiations.  This conduct 
is documented by plaintiffs' letters to counsel urging him to 
settle the case, and letters from defamation defendants' counsel 
complaining of DeCaro's failure to negotiate at all regarding 
settlement over a three-month period.  Had DeCaro worked 
diligently toward a settlement, this malpractice action might 
never have been filed and the underlying action probably could 
have been resolved more favorably to his clients.  This would 
have allowed other litigants their day in court sooner.  
Discouraging this conduct would serve the salutary purposes 
articulated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Muhammad. 
         Furthermore, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court articulated in 
Muhammad, as an additional reason for its decision, that 
"settlements reduce the stress and concrescent negativity 
associated with protracted litigation." 587 A.2d at 1351.  The 
record suggests that as DeCaro delayed, defamation defendants 
became less willing to agree to settle their personal differences 
with plaintiffs and to refrain from printing derogatory stories 
in The Spotlight in the future.  Were a jury to find this 
persuasive, the evidence would support a conclusion that DeCaro's 
conduct increased rather than decreased the stress and negativity 
by protracting the litigation. 
         We believe that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would 
consider the policies articulated in Muhammad, the superior court 
cases interpreting Muhammad narrowly, and the jurisprudence of 
other states, in determining whether it would extend Muhammad to 
bar this present action.  Having done so, we predict that it 
would conclude that a broad reading of Muhammad would be an 
unwise course which would run counter to the important policy 
goals it expressed therein.  Therefore, we hold that Muhammaddoes not bar 
plaintiffs' malpractice action. 
                               III. 
         Although the action is not barred, defendants assert that 
plaintiffs cannot show any harm.  Plaintiffs specifically allege 
that they were harmed by counsel's failure to serve three 
defamation defendants, which resulted in the court's dismissal of 
the case against those defendants for lack of service.  
Plaintiffs also allege that counsel did not engage in discovery, 
seriously hampering their ability to prove their claims had they 
gone to trial.  A letter from defamation defendants' counsel 
indicates that his clients had been amenable to an agreement 
which would include a provision that, in the future, they would 
refrain from engaging in the conduct complained of by plaintiffs.  
The letter also indicates that as DeCaro procrastinated, 
defamation defendants became less amenable to refrain from 
disparaging remarks.  The record has sufficient allegations and 
is replete with evidence of DeCaro's omissions and the resulting 
harm to plaintiffs.  Indeed, in the defamation case the 
magistrate judge and district judge often resolved motions 
against plaintiffs based on DeCaro's failure to comply with 
procedure, failure to respond to pleadings, and his failure to 
follow the court's previous orders.  These allegations, if 
established to the satisfaction of a fact-finder, would be 
sufficient to establish harm. 
                               IV. 
         The O'Malley firm asserts as an alternative basis for 
affirming the summary judgment in its favor that it cannot be 
held liable for malpractice because, at the time DeCaro left the 
O'Malley firm, although DeCaro had not served Pifer, Tiffany, and 
Ryan within the 120 days contemplated by the Federal Rules, 
DeCaro had been given more time to complete service.  Further, it 
argues, the dismissal of these defamation defendants for failure 
to serve did not occur until well after DeCaro left the O'Malley 
firm.  Therefore, DeCaro's alleged negligence did not come to 
"fruition" until after DeCaro left.  With respect to discovery 
negligence, the O'Malley firm makes the same argument: 
         O'Malley & Miles, however, cannot be held responsible 
         for any alleged legal malpractice arising out of the 
         failure to initiate discovery efforts as adequate time 
         to conduct discovery existed even after DeCaro had left 
         O'Malley & Miles . . . . The initial defamation suit 
         filed by Wassall wherein he had hired DeCaro was still 
         being litigated and discovery was still proceeding 
         while DeCaro was working at his new law firm. . . . 
         The district court did not discuss this basis for summary 
judgment in its opinion because initial discovery in this 
malpractice action had been limited to the Muhammad issue.  
Plaintiffs argue that, because discovery was limited to the 
Muhammad issue, affirming on this ground would be unfair.  They 
add that allocating fault among the two firms and DeCaro is not 
properly performed on summary judgment. 
         The extent of O'Malley's liability and involvement has not 
been thoroughly briefed due to the bifurcated discovery.  In 
their joint motion requesting the district court to bifurcate 
discovery and initially limit it to the Muhammad issue, the 
malpractice defendants stated: 
         Plaintiffs' Complaint contains twenty-one (21) counts 
         of alleged malpractice, in connection with the 
         underlying defamation actions which involved sixteen 
         (16) parties.  As such, it is anticipated that 
         discovery regarding the underlying action will entail 
         numerous depositions, interrogatories, requests for 
         production of documents and requests for admissions. 
Thus, affirming on this ground would deny plaintiffs the 
opportunity to conduct discovery and properly defend against the 
summary judgment motion. 
         The O'Malley firm also overlooks the fact that the three 
defamation defendants who were not served within the 120 day time 
period were not served while DeCaro worked for the O'Malley firm.  
O'Malley essentially argues that because DeCaro's negligence 
continued after he left the firm, it is relieved of its potential 
liability.  But the retainer agreement drafted by O'Malley 
provides that it is between the O'Malley Firm (by DeCaro) and 
plaintiffs.  The agreement lists O'Malley as "the Attorney" and 
DeCaro as the "Attorney who will be primarily responsible for the 
representation of the Client."  Nowhere does it state that all 
liability for professional negligence travels with the primary 
attorney. 
         Because discovery was bifurcated at the O'Malley firm's 
request, we will not affirm on this alternative ground.  
Plaintiffs should be given a full opportunity to support their 
allegations regarding the O'Malley firm's liability in the 
district court after discovery. 
                                V. 
         In sum, we reverse the summary judgment in favor of 
defendants and remand for further proceedings consistent with 
this opinion. 
                             
